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Abstract
Background: The outbreak of Ebola virus disease (EVD) in West Africa between 2014 and 2015 was the largest EDV
epidemic since the identification of Ebola virus (EBOV) in 1976, and the countries most strongly affected were Sierra
Leone, Guinea, and Liberia.
Findings: The Sierra Leone-China Friendship Biological Safety Laboratory (SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab), a fixed Biosafety
Level 3 laboratory in the capital city of Sierra Leone, was established by the Chinese government and has been
active in EBOV detection since 11 March 2015. Complete management and program documents were created for
the SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab, and it was divided into four zones (the green, yellow, brown, and red zones) based on
the risk assessment. Different types of safe and appropriate personnel protection equipment (PPE) are used in
different zones of the laboratory, and it fully meets the Biosafety Level 3 laboratory standards of the World Health
Organization.
Conclusion: Good preparedness, comprehensive risk assessment and operation documents, appropriate PPE,
effective monitoring and intensive training, together with well-designed and reasonable laboratory sectioning are
essential for guaranteeing biosafety.
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Background
The Ebola virus disease (EVD) outbreak that occurred
in West Africa between 2014 and 2015 was the largest
EDV epidemic since the identification of Ebola virus
(EBOV) in 1976 [1–3]. The countries most strongly
affected were Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone,
accounting for 99 % of EVD cases worldwide [4–7].
Shortly after EDV emerged in West Africa in 2014, the
Chinese government offered to provide large-scale
medical aid to the three most strongly affected coun-
tries [8, 9]. The aid included establishment of a fixed
Biosafety Level 3 (BSL-3) laboratory in Freetown, the
capital city of Sierra Leone. The project began on 20
November 2014 and construction was completed on 31
January 2015. The first round of fixed laboratory team
from National Institute for Viral Disease Control and
Prevention (NIVDC), Chinese Center for Disease Con-
trol and Prevention (China CDC) arrived in Sierra
Leone on 8 February 2015. This laboratory, called the
Sierra Leone-China Friendship Biological Safety La-
boratory (SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab) has been perform-
ing EBOV detection since 11 March 2015.
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Layout of the SLE-CHN biosafety lab
As shown in Fig. 1, the SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab
mainly consists of a BSL-3 laboratory with negative
pressure, a BSL-2 laboratory, a PCR preparation room,
a storage room and two sets of dressing rooms (in-
cluding two 1st changing rooms, two shower rooms
and one 2nd changing room). The BSL-3 laboratory is
connected to the other labs through two transfer win-
dows (a “clean” transfer window and a “dirty” transfer
window). In addition, the lab contains a central con-
trol room and offices on the left side, and a decontam-
ination room, an electricity distribution room, and an
air conditioning engine unit on the right side. The
pressure in the BSL-3 laboratory is recorded by check-
ing the pressure gauge in the lab every day, and it was
also real-time monitored in the central control room.
The air flow in BSL-2 laboratory is also monitored in
the central control room. The generator, water supply-
ing unit and incineration units are located outside the
building. The SLE–CHN Biosafety Lab fully meets the
biosafety level 3 laboratory standards of the World
Health Organization (Fig. 1) [10].
Document management for the SLE-CHN
Biosafety Lab
Prior to arrival in Sierra Leone, a set of laboratory man-
agement and program documents were prepared based
on the BSL-3 documents of the NIVDC, China CDC.
Those documents were revised after we arrived at the
SLE–CHN Biosafety Lab, according to the acute situ-
ation. The documents are comprised of four layers, in-
cluding the management manual (30 files, describe the
quality management system documentation), program
documents (50 files, describe the function of quality
requirement allocation), standard operation procedures
(SOP) (20 files, describe the operation procedures, in-
spection standard, etc.), and working manual (29 files,
describe the records of operation results). All documents
were reviewed and issued by the Biosafety Committee of
NIVDC.
Functional sectorisation and operating procedure
optimisation
Risk assessments help us ensure the hazards will not

































































































































Fig. 1 Layout of Sierra Leone-China Friendship Biological Safety Laboratory. The SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab mainly consists of a BSL-3 laboratory with
negative pressure, a BSL-2 laboratory, a PCR preparation room, a storage room and two sets of dressing rooms (including two 1st changing rooms,
two shower rooms and one 2nd changing room). The BSL-3 lab is connected to other labs through two transfer windows (a “clean” transfer
window and a “dirty” transfer window). In addition, it contains a central control room and offices on the left side, and a decontamination
room, an electricity distribution room and an air conditioning engine unit on the right side. The lab was divided into four zones, including a
green zone, a yellow zone, a brown zone, and a red zone, which are indicated in the corresponding colours. Blue lines show the routes for
specimen transportation through the lab
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however, the probability of incidence occurring can be
minimized through risk assessment. Based on the risk
assessment for EBOV, the SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab was
sectioned into a green zone, which had no risk of con-
tamination [including the central control room, offices,
lobby (where the laboratory staffs getting into the BSL-3
lab), electricity distribution room, and air conditioning
engine unit]; a yellow zone, which had the potential for
contamination with EBOV nucleic acids (including the
BSL-2 lab, the PCR preparation room, the storage room,
the corridor, the 1st changing room, the shower room,
and the decontamination room); a brown zone, which
has the potential for contamination with EBOV nucleic
acids and an extremely low risk of contamination with
live EBOV (2nd changing room); and a red zone, which
has the potential for contamination with live EBOV
(BSL-3 lab) (Fig. 1).
The operating procedures and routes for EBOV detec-
tion were carefully draw up. Briefly, samples from patients
suspected to have EVD were transferred into the BSL-3
lab in a specimen container via the “dirty” transfer win-
dow, after decontamination of the outside of the container
with 0.5 % chlorine-containing disinfectant. The processes
of package unwrapping, sample registration and photo-
graphing, sample aliquoting, EBOV inactivation [11], and
a blood assay for malaria (colloidal gold method) were
performed in the biosafety cabinet in the BSL-3 labora-
tory. The inactivated samples were transferred to the RNA
extraction bench for either manual or automatic RNA ex-
traction. The extracted RNA containing Eppendorf tubes
that in a corrosion-resistant box had been soaked in disin-
fectant for at least 10 min for external disinfection, were
then transferred to the BSL-2 lab via the “clean” transfer
window for EBOV detection using a commercial real-time
RT-PCR kit for EBOV (Zaire strain) (Registration No:
China Mechanical Criteria 20143402058). PCR reactions
were performed in a real-time PCR thermocycler on the
bench in BSL-2 and the results were read automatically.
All materials that came into contact with clinical samples
were immediately soaked in a 0.5 % chlorine-containing
disinfectant for at least 10 min. Waste from the BSL-3 lab
was carefully wrapped in a biohazard bag and sterilised
twice, the first round of sterilisation was performed in an
autoclave in BSL-3 laboratory, then transferred to another
autoclave in the decontamination room via the “dirty”
transfer window for a second round of sterilisation. Waste
from the BSL-2 lab was sterilised directly in the autoclave
in the decontamination room. All sterilised waste was
incinerated.
Safe and appropriate personnel protection
equipment (PPE)
All personnel authorized to enter the laboratory must be
well trained. Staff entering the yellow zone must wear at
least disposable protective clothing, a disposable medical
protective mask, a disposable hat, long-sleeved medical
rubber gloves and overshoes. Staff entering the BSL-3
lab must wear a long-sleeved inner gown, a disposable
hat, lab stockings, an N95 mask, inner-layer gloves,
medical protective clothing, long-sleeved medical outer
gloves and lab shoes in the 1st changing room, and over-
shoes and long waterproof boots covers in the shower
room, a positive-pressure breathing protection device
and disposable waterproof clothing in the 2nd changing
room. Fit test must be done for all staffs that use the
N95 mask. When leaving the BSL-3 lab, staff should re-
move the disposable waterproof clothing and replace the
outer-layer gloves within the core area. The exterior
layer of the protective clothing, the boot covers and the
outer-layer gloves should be disinfected with 0.5 %
chlorine-containing disinfectant for at least 10 min in
the 2nd changing room, and then the positive-pressure
breathing protection device, medical protective cloth-
ing, boot covers and outer gloves were carefully re-
moved. The N95 mask, disposable hat, overshoes and
inner-layer gloves should be removed in the shower
room. In the 1st changing room, staff should remove
the remaining inner PPE and change into their own
clothes. PPE removal in the BSL-3 region and the 2nd
changing room should be carefully monitored by a
working partner or by the staffs in the central control
room through the emergency window (Fig. 1).
Guarantee of biosafety and EBOV RNA-free
environment
In 2015, between 11 March and 20 April, a total of 913
specimens were received in the SLE-CHN Biosafety Lab,
including 350 blood specimens and 563 throat swabs.
Among them, 44 were positive for EBOV, and the posi-
tive rates were 11.71 % in blood samples (41/350) and
0.53 % (3/563) in throat swab samples.
Based on the quality assurance requirement, contam-
ination of the laboratory region with EBOV RNA
should be evaluated by real-time RT-PCR every 2
months, so the first evaluation had been done at the
end of the mission. Environmental specimens were col-
lected with swabs, including (1) the surface of sample
acceptance desk, (2) the temporary storage refrigerator,
(3) the operation platform of biosafety cabinet in BSL-3
lab (before and after use), (4) the RNA extraction bench
in the BSL-3 lab (before and after use), (5) the auto-
clave in the BSL-3 lab (inside and outside), (6) the cen-
trifuge in the BSL-3 lab (inside and outside), (7) the
transfer windows in the BSL-3 lab (“clean” and “dirty”),
(8) the bench in the preparation room (before and after
use), (9) the operation platform of biosafety cabinet in
the BSL-2 lab (before and after use) and (10) the real-
time PCR facility in BSL-2 (inside and outside). Each
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specimen was tested in duplicate. All samples were
EBOV negative, indicating that the environment was
EBOV RNA-free.
Conclusion
Any improperly performed operations, from the accept-
ance of specimens to PCR preparation, will result in the
possibility of EVD laboratory infection or environmental
contamination with EBOV RNA, making test results un-
reliable. The absence of EBOV RNA in the laboratory
environmental samples in this study reflects the import-
ance of good laboratory practice for control of potential
contamination with viral nucleic acids.
Therefore, appropriate PPE and good practices are
essential for protecting medical and laboratory staff deal-
ing with EVD. We believe that adequate preparation, com-
prehensive risk assessment and operation documents,
appropriate PPE, effective monitoring and intensive train-
ing, together with well-designed and reasonable sectioning
of the biosafety laboratory, are essential for guaranteeing
biosafety.
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